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In the context of the growing importance of energy issues in international relations
the author analyses the influence of the redefined concept of energy security on
foreign and national security policy of the Republic of Poland. The article deals with a
new paradigm of energy security, in the framework of the creation of European
Energy Policy. Basic features of the Polish energy sector are also presented, and
foreign and national security initiatives on bilateral, regional and multilateral level,
oriented to diversification of energy sources, suppliers and transport routes, aimed to
guarantee a long-term economic, political and security stability are analysed.
A comparison with the current energy situation in the
Republic of Croatia is given fast approval of strategic energy documents is
recommended in the conclusion of the article.
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1. Introduction
Without doubt, energy issues have an increas-
ingly important role in public debate all over the world.
The complexity and the catholicity of economic and
environmental challenges we are facing combined with
serious implications for the sensitive balance in inter-
national relations and its growing impact on everyday
life of almost each individual expanded the impor-
tance and the intensity of the debate outside the focus
of interest reserved exclusively to experts or political
elite. All of this is happening in the period when en-
ergy resource prices, especially oil, seem to follow
completely unpredictable patterns and when the words
"energy security" are repeated like a salvation mantra
• First secretary in the Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in
Poland.
in search of some kind of geopolitical and geo-strate-
gic equilibrium. Also, in the circumstances of grow-
ing asymmetrical dependence of consuming states on
producing states, some delicate issues tend to distort
the established negotiating positions and relations.
These are the issues of transport, more precisely of
defining future pipeline directions and routes, as well
as trends of economic development and geopolitical
tensions (mainly the increase of energy demand in
India and the PR of China and the strengthening of
the international position of Russia by exploiting the
advantage of "energy" pressures).
In such a context, we decided to explore how
those global energy changes have influenced the proc-
ess of redefming foreign and national security policy
priorities of the Republic of Poland. We have also tried
to explore the reshaping of modalities of the realiza-
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tion of those priorities, analyzing, on one hand, fun-
damental characteristics of the country's energy sec-
tor while bearing in mind both the actual status of Po-
land in the international community and global for-
eign policy trends on the other.
At the beginning, just a few conceptual and meth-
odological remarks are made to explain and clarify our
research approach. The article is divided in three parts.
In the first part we elaborate the redefmed paradigm of
"energy security" in the context of creating conditions
for the constitution and shaping of the common ,,Euro-
pean Energy Policy (EEP)", its external dimension, in
particular. The EEP is perceived as a set of instruments
and measures for the realization of policy priorities
within the framework of what has recently been de-
fined as "energy security diplomacy".
The relationship between the main features of
Poland's energetic sector and its repercussions for stra-
tegic decisions in that field for actual economic, secu-
rity and foreign policy status of the Republic of Poland
as well as its possible influence on future developments
and trends are examined in the second part of the arti-
cle.
The third, most extensive chapter is dedicated to
the presentation and the evaluation of concrete Polish
initiatives and projects, aiming to foster interstate co-
operation in the energy sector. Those issues are analyzed
on three levels: bilateral, regional and multilateral. The
bilateral analysis consists mostly in presenting the state
of play in relations with the key neighbours, the Rus-
sian Federation and Germany. The regional level of
analysis deals with Polish attempts to impose its lead-
ership role in the wider region, not only concerning the
energy issues, but also in a broader dimension of "East-
ern Perspective", by assuming a role oflink for the ED
partnership, neighbourhood and enlargement policies.
Within a multilateral context, we have noticed the in-
creased Polish activism in "Euro-Atlantic"fora, mainly
with the objective to raise the sensitivity of partners to
accept energy issues as priority.
The research findings are summarised in the con-
clusion, arguing that, from the Polish perspective, the
changed, multidimensional energy security pattern has
a growing impact on strategic foreign and security policy
decisions. In addition, the conclusion provides a com-
parison with the actual situation in Croatia, where "en-
ergy" debate in recent weeks has intensified.
2. The Concept of "Energy Secu-
rity" in the Light of the Creation of
"European Energy Policy (EEP)"
In today's world characterized by increasing
interdependency among economic and political sys-
tems and multipolarity, in which, in an extremely dy-
namic, unstable and even uncertain environment a
"newer world order" is (re)shaping, energy is not only
an economic and strategic good but is becoming a
political tool'.
Awareness of such far reaching transformation
has imposed the need to redefine the notion of "en-
ergy security" which is usually defined in terms of
reliable supplies at a reasonable price containing,
from the ED perspective, three interrelated and in-
terdependent elements of policy priority: security of
supply, environmental sustainability and price com-
petitiveness.'
Today, in the new circumstances, such a defi-
nition is insufficient', Complex and diverse aspects
of security policy must be taken into consideration
in order to explain the concept of security. It is not
the matter only of its energy aspect, but also a much
wider context of global threats and a spectrum of new
types of risk' (e.g. terrorism, proliferation ofWMDs,
strengthening of autocracies of dubious or limited
democratic legitimacy, danger of "spill-over" effect
for latent conflicts). Consequently, a new multidi-
mensional concept of "energy security" which rec-
ognizes at least four different, but often interrelated
dimensions (internal policy, economic, geopolitical
and security policy) has developed.'
A more detailed presentation of relevant fea-
tures of each dimension seems important in order to
define essential elements that influence the shaping
of "European" as well as "national" energy policies.
In that respect, components of internal policy
dimension might be e.g. investments in R&D and in
maintenance of infrastructure, advance planning for
crisis management response (e.g. Early Warning
Mechanism-EWM), improving energy efficiency and
"energy mix" issues.
The economic dimension includes regulatory
issues related to energy markets, mainly, creation and
implementation of common and agreed rules for re-
source trading (possibly under auspices of an inter-
national body) and issues regarding the maintenance
of competitive advantage in technology innovations
in energy domain (e.g. renewable sources, bio-fuels,
efficiency).
The geopolitical aspect of energy security com-
prises, on the one hand, creation of (pre )conditions
for undisturbed functioning of transnational networks
and corridors in a wider regional context (e.g. inter-
nal market for ED countries, Energy Charter»; and,
on the other, finding efficient answers (e.g. through
strengthening soft power approach) to the new chal-
lenges offered by visible trends of "energy sover-
eignty" or, even "energy nationalism" in different
parts of the world (i.e., disputable process of
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"statalization" of Yukos in Russia, or questionable
moves of Presidents Morales of Bolivia and Chavez
of Venezuela, in reference to nationalization of some
of the energy sector enterprises).
Finally, security policy dimension, which
dominates the "energy" debate, includes, as we have
mentioned, new forms of threats, which cannot be
eliminated relying exclusively on softer instruments,
regardless of how much such approach may appear
desirable due to elusive political correctness or dip-
lomatic acceptability. We do not refer here only to
military or, moreover, war option. However, the Iraqi
example shows, chances for new armed conflicts with
the aim to get control over natural resources are cer-
tainly not completely unrealistic". Rather, we refer
to the development of adequate security strategies,
both long-term ones and those intended for ad hoc
crisis management (e.g. in the framework of CFSP/
ESDP EU instruments or under the NATO umbrella).
Those strategies should preferably keep complemen-
tary character in relation to proposed modalities of
action in the framework of multidimensional ap-
proach to the improvement of energy security."
In such a complex, fluid and instable foreign
policy, economic and security environment, elements
of common EEP, especially in relation to defmition
of parameters ofits external dimension, have slowly
started to emerge".
Despite the fact that the process of European
integration, in a way, started on "energy" founda-
tions with the constitution of ECSC and
EUROATOM, the issues regarding the reduction of
energy dependency, recognition of modified forms
of security and geopolitical threats as well as the
search for modalities of coordinated and effective
answer to those challenges, have until recently been
outside the focus of interest ofEU policy makers and
broader public.
It seems that only the first Russian-Ukrainian
"gas crisis" in January 200610, which escalated with
a short-term interruption of gas supply and had dra-
matic consequences for energy situation in a number
of the EU countries, marked the signal for serious
alarm, when key stakeholders suddenly became
aware not only of the fragility and vulnerability of
the existing system but, also, of the necessity offmd-
ing efficient mechanisms for response to crisis situa-
tions.
A detailed analysis of all relevant aspects of
the EEP by far exceeds the objective of this article;
therefore, we have decided to focus our attention
mainly on its external dimension", which includes
instruments at the disposal ofEU member states (MS)
and EU institutions for the realization of energy pri-
orities 12. However, it is necessary at the beginning to
describe the context of the analysis, i.e. the stratifi-
cation and the complexity of various aspects of the
problem, mostly a high level of conditionality in the
interplay between MS and EU institutions.
First, distribution of competencies and relevant
action measures at disposal to each player should be
described. On the one hand, regarding the energy is-
sues, MS retain exclusive competencies in the do-
main of "energy mix" and CFSP, while the EU, on
supranational level, maintains competencies related
to internal market and competition policy, on the
other. It is highly important to find a right balance in
those complex and delicate relations.
In addition, the uneven negotiation power and
various, sometimes contrasted interests between, both
individual MS as well as between MS and EU insti-
tutions should be remembered, because those fac-
tors have dominant influence on the dynamics and
the intensity of integration process, depending, ul-
tima ratio, on the political will of each and every
MS.
In the light of completely modified global geo-
political and security circumstances we are witness-
ing since the turn to a new Millennium, the EU, as a
project with the accent on economic aspects of inte-
gration (e.g. single market and common currency),
especially in the described multi-facetted context of
"energy policy", has to cope with new challenges
that have so far included slightly neglected, political
and strategic dimensions of the problem that requests
both a fresh approach and new modalities of action 13.
In conclusion, we have to bear in mind that a
real shift of power in global energy markets occurred.
As mentioned already, the continuous strengthening
of the producing countries, the exporters of energy
resources, as compared to consumers, the importing
countries, combined with extreme price volatility,
shattered the common assumption that market logics
alone will be efficient enough mechanism to find a
proper balance between demand and supply of en-
ergy. Furthermore, it has to be added that energy sec-
tor was always affected by a heavy state influence,
partly die to its strategic sensitiveness, and partly due
to fmancial implications, mainly because of impor-
tant budgetary incomes of annuity character, which
gave to state institutions, on sovereignty prerogatives,
monopolistic or, at least, privileged position they are
reluctant to recede.
In the next chapter we highlight that all those
elements in different ways influence both the formu-
lating of the EEP (which, yet, is neither common nor
unified), as well as national energy strategies.
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3. Main Features of Energy Sector
and Implications for Actual
Foreign Policy Position of the
Republic of Poland
We continue our research by highlighting ba-
sic characteristics of Polish energy sector. The as-
sumption is that its weaknesses and constraints have
an important effect not only on actual economic and
political situation in Poland, but that they will con-
tinue to have a huge impact on future developments,
especially in the circumstances when a precondition
for such an evaluation is the capacity of a country to
obtain the necessary quantities of energy needed for
its development!".
Firstly, we have to emphasize that Poland has a
peculiar structure of energy consumption where
roughly a 95% of electric energy is acquired from coal,
which is logical, considering that Poland disposes of
important coal reserves, the biggest among all EU
countries 15. Such a high level of coal dependence has
relevant environmental implications and Poland, in the
following years, may expect serious difficulties in the
adjustment to CO2 emission targets set by international
regulations. However, it is worth noting that impor-
tant efforts to reduce the level of emissions in line
with the Kyoto Protocol, has been made (reduction of
30% in comparison to values from 2005). The adjust-
ment to the so called "EU climate-energy package"
can cause even bigger problems, mainly in the part of
"auction emission trading scheme", due to the fact that
the Polish side is not completely satisfied with the
approved annual quotas of208.5 million tons (which
is a diminution of 26.7% in reference to Polish re-
quests in negotiations with the EC).
Secondly, as consequence of Soviet domination
in the region and inherited pipeline infrastructure lay
down in east-west direction, Poland is highly depend-
ent on energy import from Russia. Regarding oil, Po-
land, whose yearly consumption is roughly 23 MTA,
imports from Russia around 96% of the necessary
quantities". They are transported through Druzba pipe-
line, which seems to be losing importance in Russian
strategic energy combinations, causing additional dan-
gers for Poland". In reference to natural gas, Polish
consumption amounts to 14.4 BCM pIa with around
two thirds of the quantities from import", again from
Russia". In such a context, diversification of energy
sources and development of alternative transport
routes, especially on the north-south axis, are of para-
mount importance for Poland. Oil transport can be
realized through the Naftoport terminal in Gdansk,
while, now gas is transported from the east exclusively
through Yamal-Europe pipeline. For those reasons, it
is Polish priority development project with the aim to
reduce the level of dependence on the import ofRus-
sian energy, on the Baltic pipeline (in cooperation with
Norway and Denmark) and the LNG terminal in
Swinojuscie on the Baltic Sea for gas transport, also
on the Odessa-Brody-Plock (OBP) pipeline (more
about it) for oil transport.
Thirdly, another relevant feature of the Polish
energy sector is a strong state presence in ownership
and, consequently, in management structure of the
key companies". On political level, they may have
strong impact on the dynamism of necessary reforms
including unavoidable processes of privatization and
continuation of market liberalization, while, on the
operational level, they may affect efficiency and
transparency of business decision making.
Fourthly, regarding the perspectives of the
Polish energy sector development, the demand for
energy will undoubtedly continue to increase. In such
a situation, Poland will have to cope with a number of
challenges, not only of economic nature, but also with
serious foreign policy and security implications". The
right balance between hardly conceivable aspects of
sustainability is needed in the process of strategic en-
ergy decision-making, i.e. ecological, perceived as
sustainability of natural environment (in reference to
coal exploitation the solution might be adoption of
new, clean coal technologies-CCT); economic, per-
ceived as financial cost effectiveness (e.g. reliance on
EU funding or PPP projects); and political, perceived
as acceptability of proposed options for the ideal ma-
jority (regarding a predictable debate on the contro-
versial issue of exploitation of nuclear energy).
In conclusion, this short analysis highlights
that key priorities and strategies for successful ad-
justment of Polish energy system are, in the short
term, diversification of sources and pipeline routes
for supply of gas and oil", and in the long term, adop-
tion of clean technologies of coal exploitation and,
to some degree, reliance on nuclear energy.
4. Foreign Policy Initiatives of
the Republic of Poland for
Strengthening Cooperation
in Energy Domain
The new Polish government, just like the pre-
vious one, declared a set of energy security issues as
priorities of its foreign policy, as precondition to keep
the pace of economic growth of the last few years".
In such a scenario, energy security has to be viewed,
among other things, through the prism of a long-term
stability and reliability of supply, to be achieved by
diversification of suppliers and by participation in
the development of alternative pipeline projects.
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We decided to dedicate this part of the article
to Poland's foreign policy activities steered to inten-
sify energy cooperation and to reach the following
objectives: dynamic economic growth, strengthen-
ing of national security" and reinforcing of interna-
tional reputation.
For the sake of clarity, our analysis is divided
into three levels: bilateral level, mainly through the
assessment of relations with Russia and Germany; re-
gionallevel, where Poland is trying to impose its lead-
ership role; and, finally, multilateral level, through
Polish activism and pragmatism in search for fresh
solutions inside its "Euro-Atlantic dimension?".
4.1. Bilateral dimension
Within the scope of our research, we will fo-
cus our attention to energy implications of interstate
relations between Poland and Russia and, to a lesser
extent, between Poland and Germany. Our objective
is to try to evaluate the level of conditionality of those
relations by their "energy dimension", based on the
assumption that, as regards security and stability of
this part of Europe, from Polish perspective, rela-
tions with the two key neighbours are and will re-
main of crucial importance.
In that respect we will leave apart the legacy
of historic burdens that, to some degree, shape cur-
rent and/or future relations, fuelling, more or less
justified fears related to the danger of new and sub-
tle forms of expressing domination or hegemony as-
pirations.
In addition, we will estimate if and to which
extent recent changes in Poland's foreign policy,
which had its first glance external manifestation in
neighbourhood policy through redefining relations
with Russia and Germany, will affect the economic
cooperation, mainly its energy component.
Low level of cooperation characterized Polish-
Russian relations in the last few years. They have
been burdened by numerous open issues, with a ten-
dency to rely more on retorsion than on initiatives
for diminishing tensions and offer solutions. Blatant
examples are Poland's bold opposition to resuming
the EU-Russia talks or to Russia WTO accession,
and the Russian ban on meat and vegetable products
import from Poland).
With the raise to power of the coalition led by
Civic Platform (PO) the chapter of Polish foreign
policy marked by pronounced isolationism and dip-
lomatic autarchy of ideologically extremely con-
servative oriented Law and Justice (PiS)
nomenklatura was finally closed. Albeit that ap-
proach seriously threatened to marginalize Polish
influence in international community it has to be
admitted that this, rather severe and insufficiently
nuanced, diplomatic style of the Kaczynski twins,
produced some results.
As has already been mentioned, the first vis-
ible outcomes of the new approach, in the light of
redefined foreign policy strategic priorities of the new
government, both in the content and on formal level,
were the "return of Poland to the EU family" and the
redesign of neighbourhood relations. Regarding Rus-
sia, almost immediately, a sharp change in rhetoric,
with accent on new proposals for normalization of
relations was noticed (even, "unfreeze" instead of
"warming" seems a more appropriate word to de-
scribe the situation). In this respect, concrete results
followed, mostly Russian lift of the meat and veg-
etables import embargo and Polish mitigation of po-
sition regarding the Russian WTO accession and EU-
Russia resuming talks on the Partnership and Coop-
eration Agreement (in which energy issues should
have a substantive and important part, as Poland's
foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski stressed in nu-
merous occasions).
The official visit of the Polish Prime Minister,
Donald Tusk to Moscow, realized in February 2008,
marked another important step, on public perception
level at least, in improving Polish-Russian relations.
The fact that it was the first visit on such a level since
December 2001 when Leszek Miller was in Russia
(while former President Aleksander Kwasniewski
visited Moscow in 2004) says a lot about the status
and intensity of cooperation.
The visit should be seen as an attempt to revi-
talize bilateral relations by renewing dialog and co-
operation. Ifwe stick to the economic agenda, Tusk's
visit was focused on energy issues, mainly on the
two, from Polish perspective, basic elements of en-
ergy security, supply of resources and pipeline routes.
This in not surprising if we keep in mind not only
Poland's high dependency on Russian import and the
desire to keep some advantages stemming from a
transport country status, but also the fact that, at least
until now, Polish attempts to diversify supplies or
find alternative transport routes have not reached
satisfactory results. In this respect, considering that
import from Russia is financially the most accept-
able option, maintaining fair relations with Russian
suppliers, remains Polish utmost priority.
In addition, since the resources are already trans-
ported from Russia through Polish territory (pipelines
Druzba and Yamal-Europe, partly owned by
Gazprom), Tusk's visit was another opportunity to try
to convince the Russian side that a highly controver-
sial NordStream project (more about it later) was too
expensive and unnecessary and, at the same time, to
propose cooperation in alternative projects (e.g. revi-
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talizing Amber or the construction of the second branch
ofYamal pipeline). After the talks with Russian offi-
cials, Tusk expressed moderate satisfaction mostly
because of the Russian declaration that the NordStream
project would not negatively affect Polish supplies and
that the Amber project might be of some future inter-
est for Russia. Of course, expectations that Russia
might withdraw from NordStream were not founded,
so divergent opinions on that issue persist. Moreover,
former Russian Prime Minister, currently Gazprom"
chairperson, Viktor Zubkov, emphasized that it was a
project of strategic importance, essential for global
energy security not oriented against any country and
that "we all have to wait for its realization."
There are several reasons why this joint Rus-
sian-German project", "masterminded" by Vladimir
Putin and Gerhard Schroeder, and controversy" be-
hind it, deserve our full attention. Before a detailed
elaboration of its "energy" implications, it is useful
to show its broader context. On the abstract level of
the EU-MS relations, the project is a paradigmatic
example of difficulties and constraints in defming,
shaping and implementing the EEP. Namely, the ba-
sic principle every "common policy" relies on is
reaching a consensus among MS ("to speak with one
voice")" regarding a particular issue, and historic
experience teaches us that the Union has serious dif-
ficulties when it comes to conciliation of internal
differences, divergent or, even conflicted interests in
matters ofless importance than energy security.
In such a context, the question is how to find
the acceptable balance between safeguard of each
national interest and bilateral agreements and, at the
same time, not endanger the fulfilment of integra-
tion objectives defined on supranational level. Of
course, it is an issue not characteristic to energy but
inherent to almost each aspect of the EU integration
Furthermore, from the Polish perspective, fears
regarding the NordStream project have multi-facetted
manifestations both on foreign policy and on eco-
nomic levels. First, Poland is afraid of the possibil-
ity of building a strong axis in the Russian-German
cooperation, which, in the long run tends to weaken
Polish security situation and its international posi-
tion. In addition, through economic lenses, Poland
seems concerned with the negative repercussions
subsequent to the exclusion from the project of the
route, which does not include Polish territory. The
consequence would be weakening of the negotiation
power stemming from the "transport country" cir-
cumstance, also, allowing the Russian side to unilat-
erally cut-off energy delivery to Poland, whilst con-
tinuing to provide it to other European countries.
Besides those explicit risks and threats, the
Polish side assumes that there is a hidden one as well,
i.e. in the fmancial part of the project. Recent infor-
mation regarding new correction of estimated costs
for the realization of the project which now amount
to 7.4 billion euro (this is the evaluation of the mem-
bers of the consortium, while a more pessimistic sce-
nario presumes a 10 billion euro cost), once again,
caused a heated Polish opposition to the project. In
addition, the financial architecture of the project
should be observed through at least two temporal
dimensions. It is certainly a very expensive project n
the short run, whose costs are continuously increas-
ing and Poland, on numerous occasions raised ques-
tions about fmancial feasibility and project financ-
ing modalities. It is presumed that NordStream will
be financed by 30% from members of the Consor-
tium and by the remaining 70% by capital raised on
international financial market. However, the deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Economy of Poland,
Waldemar Pawlak, boldly objected that, being a
"project of pan-European interest" it might be partly
fmanced by the EIB loan within the framework of
the Trans-European Energy Networks (TEN-E),
NordStream. It seems that those fears are not com-
pletely unfounded, because the text of the Lisbon
Treaty envisages a modification in the EIB Statute
with regards to the changed modality of deliberation
in a way that "strategic decisions", a consensus is
not necessary, but a specific qualified majority for-
mula is applied (18 votes of MS which control 68%
of capital)".
Poland is not alone in its opposition to the
NordStream project. Several other countries ex-
pressed their disapproval or, at least, reserves towards
the project for different reasons (Baltic countries
raised questions regarding environmental aspects,
Ukraine and Belarus in respect to weakening of ne-
gotiation positions against Gazprom (or Russia);
Scandinavian countries, are not explicitly against the
project, but have objections regarding some ecologi-
cal, security and/or financial issues").
However, in such a context Polish position is
somewhat peculiar because it is hit by almost each
and every category of threat, albeit with different
intensity and magnitude, with considerable impact
on economic, security, environmental, foreign policy
and financial aspects on its development. Probably,
the motivation for such intensive and firm Polish
opposition to the NordStream project lies in those
complex circumstances.
We can draw a conclusion that, no matter which
the developments of NordStream will be, a fact re-
mains that gas demand in Europe will continue to in-
crease (in 2005 gas import in the EU was 336 BCM,
the estimation for 2015 are that expected demand will
be around 536 BCM on yearly basis). In that respect it
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will be interesting to monitor how the Union and indi-
vidual MS will be able to maintain the delicate bal-
ance between, satisfying energy needs through cer-
tainty and stability of supply on the one hand, and
reducing dependence on import of commodities"
mainly from Russia, transported by infrastructure
partly owned by Russian companies", and, above all,
attempt to limit growing Russian economic and po-
litical weight and importance by preventing the use of
energy as a political tool, on the other".
4.2. Regional dimension
Polish activism in foreign policy reflects on
proposals to foster energy security cooperation and
coordination that can be defined on regional scale.
In such a context it is interesting to draw the
attention to the fact that in matters of energy security
perceived as fundamental national interest, there is
no substantial divergence of positions between the
President of Poland Lech Kaczynski and the PM
Donald Tusk, which is not the case in some other
strategic foreign policy issues (e.g. Poland-USA re-
lations or role of Poland inside the EU).
We refer to a delicate situation of "cohabita-
tion" which had its complex and unhappy manifes-
tation in numerous cases of shaping and execution
of foreign policy prerogatives (i.e. recent conflicts
regarding Poland's representation at the EU Summit
in Brussels, differences in interpretation of compe-
tencies in nomination of ambassadors and, on prac-
tical level, the postponement of the French President
Sarkozy visit to Poland).
The initial impetus to enhance regional energy
cooperation was given at the Energy summit in
Krakow (May 2007) which, upon initiative of the
President of Poland, Kaczynski, and the President of
Lithuania, Adamkus, gathered also Presidents of
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine. An international
working group for solving technological and logis-
tic aspects of the mentioned OBP project was estab-
lished and it was agreed that membership to the
Polish-Ukrainian joint-venture Sarmatia, in charge
for its realization, will be open to other countries
present at the meeting.
A similar meeting took place in Vilnius in
October 2007 at the conference "Responsible Energy
for Responsible Partners" where discussions regard-
ing modalities of enhancing energy cooperation in
the region were continued.
The Ukrainian president Yushchenko hosted
the following meeting at the Kyiw Energy Forum
(May 2008). The continuation of activities for the
establishment of a "common energy area", which is
supposed to join Baltic, Black Sea and Caspian coun-
tries in developing projects of strengthening energy
independence (especially with regards to Russia
which by applying "energy" pressures wants to keep
its dominant influence in the post-Soviet area) was
signed at the meeting. The participation of Andris
Piebalgs, EC energy commissioner confirmed the EU
interest in stronger involvement in the initiative. The
practical implementation of the pipeline Odessa-
Brody-Plock-Gdansk (OBP) was on the agenda,
which, as alternative route independent from Rus-
sian influence is of primary importance for Poland.
Its main objective is to transport Caspian oil from
Azerbaijan to the Georgian port of Sopsa, then by
tankers to Odessa. The constructed part ends at Brody
in Ukraine (674 km), while an extension through the
realization of "Polish" branch to Plock and Gdansk
is planned (in the frame of INOGATE program, be-
ing of "Pan-European interest", the project received
2 million euro ofEU funds).
From the Polish perspective, it is not just about
energy issues. Within a broader framework, through
the prism of a recent Polish-Swedish initiative East-
ern Partnership Program, similar to the European
Neighbourhood Policy, the realization of the OBP
pipeline could be an important factor of strengthen-
ing Ukraine's (and to some extent Georgia's) pro-
European perspectives and ambitions, which is the
process. Poland wants to have a key role in that proc-
ess, in the footsteps of its "redefmed" link in the
(re)shaping of the EU Eastern borders, as new com-
ponent of its "reformed and renewed" foreign policy
as recently presented by minister Sikorski".
4.3. Multilateral dimension
Regarding multilateral initiatives, we will
present the key elements of Polish attitude towards
the shaping of the EEP, especially its external dimen-
sion as well as an older, but interesting, proposal to
constitute a European Energy Security Treaty, a kind
of "Energy solidarity pact", similar to NATO. These
are vivid examples of the active approach of Polish
diplomacy towards possible answers to global en-
ergy challenges.
a) European Energy Policy (EEP) - official
Warsaw took an active and pragmatic attitude towards
the EEP external dimension, considering it as poten-
tial instrument to achieve its national interest objec-
tives, and being aware of the fact that priorities of
"old" and "new" EU states are not always the same.
In the attempt of reducing energy dependence and
resources import from Russia, Poland observes a
potential space for common action and a chance for
taking a more important role inside the ED. In addi-
tion, trying to reach a consensus in negotiation with
126 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Russia is of vital interest for Poland because its voice
has more weight inside the EU than in individual
direct talks with the Russian counterpart. Another
important reason for Poland to support a stronger EEP
is the continuation of effective opposition to the
NordStream project. According to Polish views, when
the time for crucial decisions comes, bearing in mind
reserves of some other EU countries, chances for
consideration of Polish arguments are much bigger
if presented within a tighter "EU framework".
Therefore, we can conclude that there are three
main reasons of Polish interest in fostering EEP: the
need for a permanent dialogue with Russia; processes
of energy diversification, and, finally, continuation
of effective opposition to the NordStream project.
b) European Energy Security Treaty - at the
beginning of 2006 Polish PM, Marcinkiewicz, pre-
sented an initiative for institutionalized cooperation
among EU MS and NATO countries, based on prin-
ciples of solidarity and reciprocity, envisaging mecha-
nisms of efficient response to crisis situations. Rely-
ing on Article 5 of the Atlantic Charter regarding
mutual security, the proposal aimed at constitution
of common resource reserves, mechanisms for joint
management of infrastructure and forms of response
to incidents (e.g. terrorism threats, sabotage to en-
ergy plants), starting from the assumption that en-
ergy security disruption represents a threat for the
entire "Euro-Atlantic" community.
The proposal was supported by the Visegrad
group states, while Germany, France and Great Brit-
ain were sceptical. The main points of disagreement
were the intended isolation of Russia, the role of the
USA in the arrangement and the nuclear issue. There-
fore, due to the lack of political consensus, the ini-
tiative was rejected.
However, the future EU energy related docu-
ments recognized and accepted the principle of soli-
darity", the necessity of enhanced cooperation of
energy and gas operators and the need for more trans-
parency in managing resource reserves. Therefore,
the project may be considered as partial success.
5. Conclusion
The main aim of this article was to analyze in
how and to what extent energy security influences
1 See: van der Linde, C. (2008) : "Turning a Weakness into a
Strength: A smart external policy for Europe", IFRI, available at:
www.clingendael.nl/publications/2008/20080400_ciep_art_
linde_ifri.pdf
aspects of the foreign and security policy of the Re-
public of Poland.
In our opinion, through presentation of rel-
evant aspects of energy security in the context of
constitution and development of "European Energy
Policy"; through presentation of salient features of
Polish energy sector and its implications both on
decision-shaping and decision-making processes;
and, consequently, presentation of different forms and
modalities of fostering interstate energy cooperation,
the analysis supports the argument that energy is-
sues have growing impact on defining priorities and
managing the foreign and security policy thus increas-
ing influence on the international position and repu-
tation of the Republic of Poland.
The intensification of energy debate, motivated
by almost dramatic events on international financial
and commodity markets has recently manifested in
Croatia too. Although there are essential differences
between Croatia and Poland, especially regarding
"energy mix", market dimension and geopolitical
circumstances, when analyzing the "energy" impact
on foreign policy we notice numerous similarities.
On internal level, both countries have to make fur-
ther steps in privatization of energy sector and liber-
alization of energy market; there is a necessity for
diversification of sources, suppliers and routes, and
finally, both adjustments in environmental protec-
tion regulation and heavier reliance on alternative,
complementary energy resources are needed.
If we try to translate those circumstances in
the context of actual energy debate in Croatia, we
can see the increased interest in delicate issues as the
renewed initiative for the "revitalization" of the
Druzba-Adria" pipeline project (which to some ex-
tent may be compared with Polish attempts in keep-
ing advantages from the "transport position"). De-
bates regarding nuclear energy (a real "taboo", as
Croatian PM Ivo Sanader recently said), accelerated
process of gasification of the country, privatization
process ofINA, which are all encouraging signals of
the raising of awareness on energy issues that, in our
opinion, in a short time, will reflect on broader, for-
eign policy context.
In this respect, we strongly recommend fast
approval of strategic energy documents, in order to
be able to better define the context for the future de-
velopment of Croatia. 39 •
NOTES
2 Regarding Poland legal definition of "energy security" the no-
tion contains similar elements: "Energy security is defined in the
Energy Law of 10 April, 1997 (Journal of the Laws No 54, item
348 with subsequent amendments) as "the state of the economy
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enabling meeting the current and prospective demand of cus-
tomers for fuels and energy in a way which is justified from the
technical and economical point of view and, at the same time,
satisfies the environmental requirements". This definition was
assumed in "The guidelines for Poland's energy policy until 2020" .
However, from the Polish perspective, security of resources sup-
ply remains the key aspect of security.
3 For a brief chronology of development of the ·energy security"
concept and for methodological attempt of ·geographical" clas-
sification based on measurable criteria see the analysis of
Tatyana A. Mitrova "Global Energy Security", prepared as back-
ground material for energy security discussion at the G8 Summit
in Sankt Petersburg (July 2006), available at: www.en.g8russia.ru/
agenda/nrgsafety
4 In the words ofYergin: • ...The definition of energy security needs
to be expanded to cope with the challenges of the globalized
world .. .", see: Yergin, D. (2006): "Ensurinq Energy Security",
Foreign Affairs, March/April, available at: www.foreignaffairs.org/
20060301 faessay852 06/da n ie I-yerg in/e nsu ri ng-e nergy-
security.html
5 See: Baumann, F.(2008): "Enerqy security as multidimensional
concept" , CAP, Nr. 1, March, available at: www.cap.lmu.de/
download/2008/CAP-Policy-Analysis-2008-01.pdf
6 In the context of our analysis, regarding Energy Charter, it is
important to draw attention to the attempt of EU countries to "con-
vince" Russia on the necessity of ratifying both the Charter and
the so called Transit protocol. More about the Charter on:
www.encharter.org
7 See e.g.: Klare, M. (2001): Resource Wars: The New Land-
scape of Global Conflict, Metropolitan Books, New York
8 About possible forms of cooperation in the field of energy se-
curity between the EU and NATO, see: Borchert, H., Forster, K.
(2007): ·EU and NATO must work together to guarantee energy
infrastructure security and to define the role of soft vs. hard
power", Security Europe, March, available at: www.secuer.info
9 For a detailed elaboration of those issues see: van der Linde,
C. (2007): "External Energy Policy: Old Fears and New Dilem-
ma's in a Larger Union" in : "Fragmented Power: Europe and the
World Economy" (Andre Sapir ed.), Bruegel, Brussels, available
at: www.clingendael.nl/ciep/publications/energy-papers
10 For an excellent analysis of the case, which includes an ap-
plication of Messmer's conflict model on international relations,
see: Heinrich, A.: "Gazprom's Pipeline Policies: The Russian-
Ukrainian gas crisis of January 2006", International
Conference:"lnternational Relations in Eastern Europe", Hum-
boldt University (Berlin, 16-18 March 2006), available at: www2.
politik.unihalle.de/vog/tagung2006/Panel%206%20Heinrich
%20Paper.pdf
11 All relevant documents available at: www.ec.europa.eu/en-
ergy/energy J)olicy/index _en. htm
12 For a detailed analysis see: Geden, a., Marcelis, C., Maurer,
A. (2006): "Perspectives for the European Union's External En-
ergy Policy: Discourse, Ideas and Interests in Germany, the UK,
Poland and France", Working Paper FG1, 2006/17, December,
SWP Berlin, available at: www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_
document.php?asset_id=3521
13 For an overview of EEP instruments see: van der Linde (2008),
p. 30, fig. 2.
14 See: Naimski, P.: "Energy diversification strategy for Poland",
lecture hold on Columbia University (17/09/2007), available at:
www.sipa.columbia.edu/ece/academics/regional/poland.html
15 According to the data of the Ministry of Economy, which the
former state secretary Naimski, refer to, operative resources of
hard coal are over 4.5 billion tons and annual production amounts
between 97 and 100 million tons. Poland exports around 20 mil-
lion tons pIa (mainly in EU countries) and imports roughly 3 mil-
lion tons.
16 REBCO (Russian Export Blended Crude Oil).
17 If we remain on operational level, it seems that difficulties in
oil deliveries to the Mazeikiu rafinery (Lithuania), which has been
acquired by the Polish PKN Orten, were not of mere technical
nature, but may be attribute to obstructive Russian scenario.
18 According to 2006 data, total gas import in Poland was around
10 billion m3, with Russian share being around 61%.
19 Gas import is regulated by a long-term contract with Russia
the content of which is secret (signed in September 1996) and
allows Poland on take or pay basis and respecting the destina-
tion clause (which prevents the importer from further (re)selling)
to obtain the quantity of 250 BCM of gas during the next 25 years.
The gas is transported by the Yamal-Europe pipeline and the
realization of the second branch (Yamal II) was planned.
20 Ministry of Finance holds a majority stake in all energy sector
strategic companies. It possess directly 84.75% and the golden
share in PGNiG, the most important gas company; 10.20% and
the golden share in PKN Orten, the most important oil company;
6.93% and a golden share in Lotos Group (second most impor-
tant oil enterprise); 100% of the gas distributor Gaz-System and
100% of the oil distributor Pern "Przyjazn", Also, indirectly, own-
ing 100% of Nafta Polska, controls 51.91 % of Lotos Group,
17.32% of PKN Orlen and 100% of oil logistics operator OLPP.
21 See the "National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland
for 2007", which recognizes the increasing influence of energy
security on national security, in point 22 stating that: "The impor-
tance of the economic dimension of security, especially energy
security has been growing. The use of energy resources as an
instrument of political pressure by some states and the growing
rivalry for energy carriers contribute to greater risks in this area.
At the same time there is growing belief that the international
community must act together to ensure energy security, to look
for alternative sources of energy and to stop negative changes
of the global climate", available at: www.bbn.gov.pl
22 Other diversification initiatives worth mentioning are the ac-
tivities of gas monopolist PGNiG in establishing cooperation for
gas exploitation in various parts ofthe globe (e.g. Denmark, Libya
and Iran) and the so called ·energy bridge", which aims to con-
nect energy systems of Poland and Lithuania.
23 In recent years Poland's GDP growing rates are over 6%,
which is well above EU average.
24 For relevant application of a new paradigm of energy security
on aspects of national security of Poland, see: Godzimierski, J.:
"National Energy Security Debates. Proposing a new explana-
tory model", Lund Energy Security Conference, September 2007,
available at: www.cfe.lu.se/aktueIlUkonferenser.html
25 On Polish efforts how to incorporate energy security in the
transatlantic cooperation, see: "Allies and Energy: Poland, the
United States and Transatlantic Cooperation" , minister Sikorski
speech at the Hudson Institute (1st February 2008)available at:
www.hudson.org
26 Gazprom is an extremely important and interesting subject.
Regarding its dramatically increased influence in the last few
years the Financial Times offered a definition that "Gazprorn rep-
resents much more then an energy giant, now it is becoming a
crucial element of Russian (foreign) policy" For deeper under-
standing of the Gazprom phenomenon see, e.g. Nicolazzi, M.:
"Cucinare con Gazprom", Limes, 6/2006; Loskot-Strachota, A.,
Pelczynska-Nalecz, K.: "Gazprom's expansion in the EU-co-op-
eration or domination?", Centre for Eastern Studies, April 2008,
available at: www.osw.waw.pl ; "Gazprorn's Foreign Energy
Policy", thematic issue of the Russian Analytical Digest 41/08,
available at: www.res.ethz.ch
27 Although, the actual Russian PM, Putin, has recently reminded
that "Europe has to decide whether it needs this pipeline
(NordStream) or not", alluding to transport risks through Ukraine
and Belarus, which will made gas more expensive for EU coun-
tries.
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28 Regarding importance and interest, the NordStream issue is
identical to that of Gazprom. NordStream is a denomination both
for the 1220 km long offshore natural gas pipeline, which will be
laid across the Baltic Sea, from Vyborg, Russia, to Greifswald,
and for the international consortium (composed of Gazprom 51 %,
E.ON Ruhrgas AG 20%, BASFIWintershall AG 20 and N.V.
Nederlanse Gasunie) in charge for its realization. For detailed
information regarding the project see: www.nord-stream.com
29 The best illustration of the Polish position towards the
NordStream project is the statement of R. Sikorski from 2006,
the then minister of defense who compared the project to
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact from 1939.
30 For the application of the principle on EU energy policy priori-
ties see president EC Barroso's speech: "Speaking with a Com-
mon Voice: Energy Policy in the 21st Century"(Georgetown Uni-
versity, 9 February 2006), available at: www.ec.europa.eu/
commission_ barroso/presidenUpdf/speech _20060209 _en. pdf.
This principle has been formalized in the EU document Green
Paper ·A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and
Secure Energy", COM (2006)105, 8 March 2006
31 We are referring to the fact that countries which are opposed
to the project control only 2.4% of the EIB capital. Therefore, the
situation that the country which has objections to a project (e.g.
Poland) might be obliged to finance such initiative is predictable.
32 For a detailed analysis of those issues see, e.g., Larsson L.
R.: "Security Implications of the NordStream Project" prepared
by the Swedish Defense Research Agency for the EP and the
bibliography mentioned in footnote 1, available at: www.foi.se .
Also, see: Umbach, F.: "The NordStream Pipeline Project and
Perspectives for Regional Cooperation and Diversification", pres-
entation at the Vilnius Energy Security Conference, October 2007,
available at: www.vilniusconference2007.1t
33 However, it is often neglected that is a situation of mutual
dependence, because Russia exports roughly 80% of energy
resources to EU countries.
34 In recent years, much stronger Russian ·energy" presence is
visible both in Central Asia and in the Balkan's region (e.g. stan
and Kazakhstan, acquisition of majority stake in NIS of Serbia,
developments of new routes in the Southstream project...).
35 For a comprehensive overview of development of Russian
energy sector and increased Russian influence in international
relations see: Telegina, E.: "Russia as a key player on the world
energy market", presentation at the Regional geo-economic con-
ference "Enerqy security between market realities and geopoli-
tics", Zagreb, October 2007, available at: www.geoeconomic-
forum .com/konferencija2007 .asp
36 At the beginning of May 2008 in the Polish Parliament, minis-
ter Sikorski held a "proqrarnrnatlc" speech on foreign policy pri-
orities. Regarding growing energy challenge Sikorski said: • ...Es-
pecially important for us is energy security. When energy be-
comes an instrument, or even weapon, of international politics, it
stops being an economic issue and becomes a matter of na-
tional security. This is not a dilemma that can simply be solved
be pressing several free-market buttons labeled "liberalization,"
"competition," etc. We consider the mandate for a unified energy
security policy contained in the Lisbon Treaty, as a test of Union
values. We consider the following to be especially important:
- Firstly: concrete Union regulations, resulting from the spirit of
energy solidarity and translated into the language of practical
standards, that no energy projects will be financed by the Union
if they will be found by any member states to conflict with their
needs for energy security. We support greater competition in the
energy market, especially the Third Energy Packet, which fore-
sees the differentiation of production and transportation licenses.
- Secondly: unified and decisive counteraction of the Union and
other states, against any pressure or blackmail from non-Union
energy providers. Contracts with providers should contain solu-
tions for eliminating such practices.
- Thirdly: the diversification of sources and routes for the deliv-
ery of energy resources to EU countries as well as the creation
of a network of connections and warehouses allowing for the
transportation of raw materials between member countries, that-
for outside reasons-are experiencing a shortage of energy re-
sources .. .". Furthermore, regarding the "renewed" "Eastern" in-
volvement of Poland, Sikorski emphasized: •... Poland should
continue to specialize in shaping common foreign policy towards
the East. Especially due to our geographical situation, historical
experiences, cultural ties to the East, and our competency, we
not only feel predestined to such an Eastern specialization, but
are encouraged to take it up by our partners in the Union .. .". The
integral version of the speech is available at: www.msz.gov.pl/
The,Minister,of,Foreign,Affairs,on,the,Republic,of,Poland's,Foreign,
Policy,for,2008,1732S.html
37 Poland's solicitation for the acceptance of the solidarity prin-
ciple got a colloquial denomination "Musketeer's principle", and
was presented by former PM Marcinkiewicz at the World Eco-
nomic Forum in Davos in 2006.
38 It should be noted, not without some concern, that main routes
for most important European pipeline projects (with the excep-
tion for the Pan-European Oil Pipeline-PEOP) by-pass the
Croatian territory, which may cause dangerous isolation with long
term negative consequences for energy position of Croatia.
39 On 10 of November 2008, Damir Polancec, Vice Prime Minis-
ter and Minister of Economy, Labor and Entrepreneurship has
introduced Energy Strategy Green Paper of the Republic of
Croatia, launching a public consultation on this important docu-
ment, which will last during a 30-day period.
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